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Adaptability is a distinguishing feature of the human species: We thrive as hunter-gatherers, farmers, and urbanites. What properties of our brains make us highly adaptable? Here we review neuroscience studies of sensory loss, language acquisition, and cultural skills (reading, mathematics, programming). The evidence supports a flexible specialization account. On the one hand, adaptation is enabled by evolutionarily prepared flexible learning systems, both domain-specific social learning systems (e.g., language) and domain-general systems (frontoparietal reasoning). On the other hand, the functional flexibility of our neural wetware enables us to acquire cognitive capacities not selected for by evolution. Heightened plasticity during a protracted period of development enhances cognitive flexibility. Early in life, local cortical circuits are capable of acquiring a wide range of cognitive capacities. Exuberant cross-network connectivity makes it possible to combine old neural parts in new ways, enabling cognitive flexibility such as language acquisition across modalities (spoken, signed, braille) and cultural skills (math, programming). Together, these features of the human brain make it uniquely adaptable. 

Abstract Occipital cortices of different sighted people contain analogous maps of visual information (e.g. foveal vs. peripheral). In congenital blindness, “visual” cortices respond to nonvisual stimuli. Do visual cortices of different blind people represent common informational maps? We leverage naturalistic stimuli and inter-subject pattern similarity analysis to address this question. Blindfolded sighted (n = 22) and congenitally blind (n = 22) participants listened to 6 sound clips (5–7 min each): 3 auditory excerpts from movies; a naturalistic spoken narrative; and matched degraded auditory stimuli (Backwards Speech, scrambled sentences), during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. We compared the spatial activity patterns evoked by each unique 10-s segment of the different auditory excerpts across blind and sighted people. Segments of meaningful naturalistic stimuli produced distinctive activity patterns in frontotemporal networks that were shared across blind and across sighted individuals. In the blind group only, segment-specific, cross-subject patterns emerged in visual cortex, but only for meaningful naturalistic stimuli and not Backwards Speech. Spatial patterns of activity within visual cortices are sensitive to time-varying information in meaningful naturalistic auditory stimuli in a broadly similar manner across blind individuals. 

Tulving characterized semantic memory as a vast repository of meaning that underlies language and many other cognitive processes. This perspective on lexical and conceptual knowledge galvanized a new era of research undertaken by numerous fields, each with their own idiosyncratic methods and terminology. For example, “concept” has different meanings in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology. As such, many fundamental constructs used to delineate semantic theories remain underspecified and/or opaque. Weak construct specificity is among the leading causes of the replication crisis now facing psychology and related fields. Term ambiguity hinders cross-disciplinary communication, falsifiability, and incremental theory-building. Numerous cognitive subdisciplines (e.g., vision, affective neuroscience) have recently addressed these limitations via the development of consensus-based guidelines and definitions. The project to follow represents our effort to produce a multidisciplinary semantic glossary consisting of succinct definitions, background, principled dissenting views, ratings of agreement, and subjective confidence for 17 target constructs (e.g., abstractness, abstraction, concreteness, concept, embodied cognition, event semantics, lexical-semantic, modality, representation, semantic control, semantic feature, simulation, semantic distance, semantic dimension).We discuss potential benefits and pitfalls (e.g., implicit bias, prescriptiveness) of these efforts to specify a common nomenclature that other researchers might index in specifying their own theoretical perspectives (e.g., They said X, but I mean Y).